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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
CABINET 
'New techniques' 
On 16 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov discussed certain changes in the Russian government, including the 
dissolution of the Ministry of Federation Affairs, Nationalities and Migration 
Policy. Its area of jurisdiction will be divided between the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of Economic Development, the foreign ministry, and a 
new ministry. The MVD will handle a large proportion of the issues, including 
those related to migration, which will "make it possible to create a unified 
administrative system in this sphere." According to Kasyanov, a new "post of 
Russian Federation Minister handling relations between nationalities as well as 
issues linked to autonomous areas, religious faiths, and ties to public 
organizations will be introduced in Russia; ...the Ministry of Economic 
Development will handle matters relating to regional relations and municipal 
entities, and... the Foreign Ministry will handle the problems faced by our fellow-
countrymen abroad." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 18 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1018, via World News Connection) 
 
The presidential human rights commissioner in Chechnya, Vladimir Kalamanov, 
welcomed this "new approach," explaining that it "signifies the start of a search 
for new approaches to the migration problem," and that the current situation was 
"unsatisfactory." (ITAR-TASS, 0623 GMT, 17 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1017, via 
World News Connection) 
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Others are concerned, however, about the way in which this administrative 
change could bring about a "night-watchman government rather than a socialist 
government." Even on the website of one of the government's main mouthpieces, 
www.strana.ru, an article appeared that suggested that this administrative move 
was a reflection of the diminished fear of the Federation's disintegration, and a 
prelude to the "abrogating [of] treaties between the federal center and the 
regions." (strana.ru, 17 Oct 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Kalamanov had indicated that this move constituted an example of the ways in 
which the Russian president "personally devotes great attention to the problem of 
migration" and that "a quest for ways to elaborate new techniques to manage 
migration" was underway. (ITAR-TASS, 0623 GMT, 17 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1017, via World News Connection) 
 
But what kind of "new techniques" the interior ministry is going to devise is 
anybody's guess. It would not be surprising if, at some point in the near future, 
representatives of the minister handling nationalities affairs appeared in the 
seven federal districts -- Russia's answer to the national republics. 
 
REGIONS 
Old grudges 
It is clear, however, that Russia still is unhappy with Tatarstan's failure to abolish 
some articles in that republic's constitution that allegedly do not comply with 
federal laws, and with that republic's insistence on switching to the Latin 
alphabet. The controversy continues with the federal center fielding more experts 
condemning the changeover and Tatar officials repeating that the federal 
concern is political, rather than linguistic. 
 
Tatarstan's other policies also threaten federal cohesion -- especially the way in 
which the republic's government controls key enterprises and concentrates 
 3 
capital in the region. For example, recently Tatneft, a local heavy-hitting joint-
stock oil company, was allowed to acquire a number of independent enterprises 
in order to decrease the value added tax paid to the federal center. Also, unlike 
some of the other presidential plenipotentiaries to federal districts, Sergei 
Kirienko, whose Volga District includes Tatarstan, generally is compelled to 
secure the agreement of the Tatarstani government in making appointments. 
(IEWS RUSSIAN REGIONAL REPORT, 17 Oct 01) 
 
In the republic's capital, Kazan, however, residents demonstrated that 
Tatarstan's special position, already under attack, falls short of their aspirations. 
In commemorating 15 October, the day on which Ivan the Terrible's troops seized 
Kazan several hundred years ago, a rally was held demanding full 
independence. About 2,000 persons attended, accusing the republic's leadership 
of the republic of betrayal. (TV6, 0700 GMT, 15 Oct 01; via Johnson's Russia 
List)  
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
At a meeting of the Fatherland movement, its leader, Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov, spoke optimistically of the forthcoming November congress at which 
Fatherland will become a single party with Unity and possibly with the All Russia 
Movement. He predicted that the new party will become "a mass, powerful and 
influential political force capable of bearing responsibility for the country's fate." 
He also criticized the oligarchs for earning their profits at Russia's expense and 
radical political forces for trying to destabilize the country. Finally, he appealed to 
President Putin to lead the projected unified centrist party, noting that this would 
be "not only desirable but also essential" for Russia's future. (INTERFAX, 13 Oct 
01; via Johnson's Russia List) The presidential administration responded that 
President Putin had "more than once" stated that he did not plan on joining any 
political party. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 17 Oct 01) 
 
MEDIA 
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On 12 October Alfred Kokh, the managing director of Gazprom-Media, resigned 
from the board of directors. Originally, he asserted that he made this decision 
because he had fallen victim to "bureaucratic intrigues" and was gradually 
"pushed out" of managerial decision-making. (ITAR-TASS, 1324 GMT, 12 Oct 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1012, via World News Connection) 
 
Later it became clear, however, that the resignation was motivated by his plans 
to buy Gazprom's media shares (including the NTV television channel and the 
Ekho Moskvy radio station) jointly with NTV's new director, Boris Jordan, and an 
undisclosed foreign investor. (EKHO MOSKVY, 1400 GMT, 17 Oct 01; via 
Johnson's Russia List)  
 
This was not the only media deal on the market: Magnate Boris Berezovsky has 
made a $10 million offer for the TV6 television channel, to which some of the 
former NTV staff fled after new management took over. Berezovsky has political 
interests in taking over the channel; however, those interests were slighted 
shortly after his offer became public when yet another lawsuit -- by Television 
News Services for a $3 million early debt collection -- was instituted. (THE 
RUSSIA JOURNAL, 20 Oct 01; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Others in the Russian media have more to worry about than just lawsuits. Amidst 
death threats, Novaya gazeta correspondent Anna Politkovskaya, known for her 
work in Chechnya, has been forced to flee to Vienna. These threats presumably 
relate to Politkovskaya's charge that a helicopter carrying high-ranking military 
officers, one of whom was to report to President Putin on the conduct of the 
Russian soldiers in Chechnya, was shot down not by rebels but by the military 
itself. (CPJ, 15 Oct 01; via www.cpj.org) The threats were given particular 
poignancy by the fact that a female resident of Politkovskaya's apartment 
building was murdered. (See Politkovskaya's interview with ichkeria.org, 8 Oct 
01) 
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The death threats are all the more menacing since they appeared soon after an 
assassination attempt against the editor-in-chief of Novaya gazeta's Ryazan 
bureau, Aleksei Frolov, and his family. The newspaper reports that, on the 
evening of 2 October, poisonous gas was leaked into Frolov's apartment through 
the keyhole; the journalist, his mother and his pregnant wife were lucky to have 
survived. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 8 Oct 01; via www.novayagazeta.ru.) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Concern and change 
A growing concern over their personal safety has aroused Russian citizens to 
take new interest in domestic security measures. However, this renewed interest 
may not be shared by Russia's major security organs. With even the most 
powerful states vulnerable to terrorism, the newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta 
decided to interview those charged with ensuring Russia's internal security. 
 
The correspondents started with the Security Council, where staffers then 
passed them on to the press service. At the press service their requests for 
information were not answered. Not having received any information on the 
safety of Russian citizens, the reporters continued this search at all the other 
security organs. Time and again they were diverted to services that did not return 
their calls. It was not until they reached a staffer at the FSB Public Relations 
Center that they obtained any kind of response to their questions. The staffer's 
reply may have caused the reporters more concern than relief. He reassured 
them "that nothing ha[s] been done recently to beef up security at enterprises 
representing possible targets of terrorist attacks" because, as he explained, 
"these facilities already adhere to strict security guidelines and need no additional 
security measures." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1009, via World News Connection)  
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Apparently this did not alleviate the concerns of the reporters and they continued 
their search. In the end they were able to get responses only from two organs. 
One reply was provided by Sergey Fedkin, deputy division chief of the Main 
Criminal Investigation Directorate of the MVD, who said that his office was doing 
its best; however, the flow of ammunition, weapons, and explosives into illegal 
channels was continuing. The other reply was from Vitaliy Nasonov, deputy 
minister of the Atomic Energy Press Service. His reply was even more alarming 
than that of Fedkin. He stated that time and money are required to implement 
fully the new Russian security measures needed for the proper protection of 
nuclear facilities. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1009, 
via World News Connection) Somehow, these responses seemed to do little to 
reassure the journalists. 
 
Meanwhile, Moscow continues shuffling and reshuffling security cadres in 
Chechnya. The head of the Russian-installed Chechen cabinet, Stanislav 
Ilyasov, said that the new directors of the Department of the Interior and the 
Federal Security Service Department in the republic will be nominated by 
Moscow. As Ilyasov explained, "current law does not require mandatory 
coordination of such appointments with regional administrations." (INTERFAX, 
0746 GMT, 12 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1012, via World News Connection) Only 
a few days later, Ilyasov's rival, Akham Kadyrov, head of Moscow's Chechen 
administration, took local power organs under his personal control with Moscow's 
apparent blessings. (IZVESTIA, 19 Oct 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Vladimir Putin: Hobnobber extraordinaire 
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Russian President Vladimir Putin cashed in on his efforts to develop a network of 
relationships with foreign leaders during the recent Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum held in Shanghai. Putin clearly intended to waste no 
time during the conference, having already sent a high-level advance team to 
Shanghai, including Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov. (ITAR-TASS, 
1105 GMT, 17 Oct 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Putin arranged meetings with a number of Pacific leaders, both for closing deals 
and laying the groundwork for future cooperation. Among the highlights:  
 
• 19 October meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. The two 
leaders confirmed increased cooperation in transportation, energy and 
fishing. More significantly, Putin re-established a role for Russia in any 
settlement between the two Koreas. (ITAR-TASS, 1257 GMT, 19 Oct 01; 
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The statements 
were even more noteworthy in light of this summer's visit to Russia by 
North Korean President Kim Jung-il. During that visit, the first by the North 
Korean president since the early 1980s, similar cooperation agreements 
were discussed. (PRAVDA, 30 Jul 01; via online Pravda) 
 
• 19 October meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. 
This meeting was notable because of the large Muslim population in both 
countries and in light of Russia's ongoing struggles with Muslim minorities 
throughout the North Caucasus. (ITAR-TASS, 1246 GMT, 19 Oct 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database, and PRAVDA, 19 Oct 01; 
via online Pravda) The meeting focused on efforts to curb international 
terrorism. However, Putin also raised the issue of increased security 
cooperation between the two countries and closer working relationships 
between the two governments. (ITAR-TASS, 1310 GMT, 19 Oct 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It is likely also that Putin 
used the increased security cooperation clause as a springboard for 
discussions of the Indonesian arms sales market. Russia has long desired 
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a greater market share in Asia and could offer Indonesia significant 
upgrades at low cost without the human rights limitations which often 
accompany Western arms sales. The recent major arms deal with Iran 
(another country with a large Muslim population) could serve as a model 
for increased cooperation between Russia and Indonesia, although the 
Iranian sale constitutes a violation of the "Gore-Chernomyrdin" agreement. 
 
• Putin also met with other heads of state including those of China, Japan 
and Malaysia. Little or none of the substance of these talks has been 
publicized so far. (ITAR-TASS, 1610 GMT, 21 Oct 01; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) Still, it is likely that Putin is laying the 
groundwork for further cooperation. 
 
This is not to imply that everything went the Russian president's way during the 
APEC summit. He was quick to point out that he had hoped that the conference 
could focus on economic issues. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17 Oct 01) However, 
never missing an opportunity or being slow to go with the flow, Putin appears to 
have put those aspirations aside for this conference and joined in the chorus 
condemning global terrorism. He figured prominently in all press releases and 
communiqués during the event. However, he saved the most dramatic 
announcement for the last day, again drawing attention to himself and to Russia 
as a regional as well as a global power broker. 
 
Giving Ground on ABM? 
On the last day of the summit, following a meeting with President Bush, the two 
issued a joint statement and held a press conference regarding the future of the 
controversial 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Until now, Putin has tried 
to hold the US to the terms and conditions contained in the ABM Treaty in an 
effort to slow American development of National Missile Defense (NMD). During 
the press conference Putin finessed the Russian position, stating that though 
Moscow's position was "well known," it was important to "look to the future." 
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(THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 Oct 01) This appears to acknowledge that there is 
room for the two sides to maneuver on this issue. 
 
It was widely believed that Putin was not overly concerned about the conditions 
of the treaty (which constrain the use of anti-missile defense systems), but rather 
wanted to use the ABM treaty as leverage to blunt other Western initiatives, such 
as NATO enlargement and condemnation of Russian human rights abuses in its 
war in Chechnya. However, since the terrorism crisis on 11 September, Russia 
has soared to new heights on the international stage and has had some of its 
concerns alleviated. Not only has the West backed off on Chechnya, but 
Secretary of State Colin Powell has made several statements in support of the 
Russian offensive against "Chechen terrorists." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 
Sep 01, and ITAR-TASS, 1804 GMT, 19 Sep 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) In addition France, NATO's harshest critic of 
Russia's Chechen policies, has agreed to rethink its position. Furthermore, not 
only may NATO enlargement have been slowed by the crisis, but Russia has 
been included in several important NATO conferences and Putin himself has 
been lavishly courted by NATO Secretary-General Robertson. (NATO.INT, 3 Oct 
01) The result of this windfall of foreign policy successes for Russia may have led 
Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to determine that the time was right to 
offer the US a carrot. However, it remains to be seen what further concessions 
Russia may want in exchange for moderating its tough position on the ABM 
treaty. This is to be expected, considering how much Russia's foreign policy 
agenda has gained, remarkably, as a result of the al Qaeda assault. 
 
BRAC, Russian style 
Russia has decided to close two of its highest-profile and longest-standing 
overseas military installations at Lourdes, Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. 
The Cam Ranh Bay facility had been used as a staging and refueling installation 
for the Russian Air Force and Navy, while Lourdes has been a listening post for 
the Russian intelligence services for more than 40 years. (RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV 
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ORT, 1700 GMT, 17 Oct 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The official explanation for these proposed closures is that the 
savings to the Russian economy will be on the magnitude of $200m annually for 
the Lourdes site and about half of that for the Cam Rahn Bay location. 
(REUTERS, 18 Oct 01) However, some analysts believe that these figures are 
somewhat inflated. 
 
Regardless of whether the numbers are entirely accurate, it is clear that the 
Russian military would benefit from any reduction in expenses for overseas 
locations. Moreover, deployments by the Russian military to the Pacific have 
been reduced greatly since 1993 and the utility of the Lourdes site is 
questionable because of the introduction of highly capable eavesdropping 
satellites and ship-borne intelligence-collection packages. 
 
Some analysts believe that the Russians may want also to use the closure of 
these two installations as leverage to induce the US to reduce its much larger 
overseas presence. Moscow already has mentioned the US radar installation in 
northern Norway as a place for such a "trade-off." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Is it really all about a war on terrorism? 
Despite otherwise incompatible views, governments within the "coalition" do 
agree that the Taliban regime of Mullah Omar needs to be replaced (not 
necessarily by a Northern Alliance-dominated government), and that Osama bin 
Laden and his Al Qaeda followers have to go. This consensus works especially 
well for Russia, which, with minimal effort and risk, seems to be getting what it 
wants: the demise of a radical and potentially threatening fundamentalist Islamic 
regime which had required a significant military commitment along the Tajik-
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Afghan border. (The Russians maintain at least 10,000 troops along that border.) 
Most recently, it appears that Russia (along with China and Iran) has been 
sketching out the Afghanistan politico-military end game. 
 
What Russia wants 
Russia wants the former Soviet Union's global power status back, along with 
economic prosperity and a modern military capable of enforcing that status, but 
without the consequent economic drain. Russia's president clearly is using the 11 
September attacks and American coalition-building efforts to improve his 
bargaining position vis-à-vis President Bush. In the spirit of the old adage, 
nothing ventured, nothing gained, some items on Moscow's wish list include: 
Washington giving up its National Missile Defense (NMD) plans, ending criticism 
of the war in Chechnya, halting NATO expansion initiatives, and lifting the 
sanctions against Iraq. 
 
The Russian scorecard so far 
Russia's position on US National Missile Defense is that its existence could not 
have prevented the 11 September attacks; therefore, the US should abandon this 
effort. However, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, after making 
positive comments about US-Russian cooperation, staunchly defended the US 
position on NMD. In fact, she said, the US position is even more persuasive now 
than it was prior to the attacks, since the threat of ballistic missile attacks by 
terrorists cannot be ruled out. This may be a subtle way of letting Moscow know 
that Washington still views with concern the DPRK and Iran (plus Iraq) as 
potential threats to US and regional security. (IZVESTIA DAILY, 15 Oct 01; 
United Press International, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Unlike the Chechen war itself, Putin can claim a clear victory in the media 
campaign. Not only has the US diminished its criticism of the war in Chechnya, 
but some administration officials have echoed Russian sentiments labeling 
Chechen rebels as "terrorists." (INTERFAX, 28 Sep 01; via RFE/RL Newsline) 
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Wasting no time, Putin appears to be expanding the notion of Russia battling 
"terrorists" to include potential military actions in Georgia, without rebuff so far. 
Lately Russia and its Abkhaz allies have muddied the waters, asserting that a 
Chechen-Georgian group had attacked Abkhazia.. Putin apparently is using the 
threat of extending Russia's war in Chechnya into Georgia's Kodori Gorge to 
force President Eduard Shevardnadze to abandon his efforts to oust the Russian 
military presence from Georgia. (INTERFAX, 1132 GMT, 9 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-1009, via World News Connection) Tbilisi consistently has leaned more 
toward the West than toward Russia. However, there has been little visible 
support for Shevardnadze from the West in recent weeks. Thus the Russian 
military is obtaining a free hand in Chechnya, and perhaps in Georgia as well. 
 
Full speed ahead 
As the US focuses most of its attention on building a global "coalition," Russia is 
moving ahead at warp speed in an effort that amounts to picking the pockets of 
the US by luring away traditional American arms purchasers. During the last few 
weeks Moscow has turned its attention to Southeast Asia to make a run on a 
bigger portion of the nearly US $200 billion that the region spent on weapons last 
year. Southeast Asia accounts for nearly one-quarter of the global demand for 
military purchases, and Moscow wants a bigger slice of that pie. Cheap Russian 
military products are appealing to many Third World countries that are trying to 
stretch their small budgets. At the international air and naval show LIMA-2001, 
Russia's deputy chairman of the committee for military cooperation with foreign 
states, Mikhail Novikov, stated that substantive talks were held with military 
representatives from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines 
and Brunei. Moscow was offering the latest short-, medium- and long-range 
missile defense systems. (ITAR-TASS, 1015 GMT, 14 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
1014, via World News Connection) 
 
Farther to the East, for the first time a South Korean military delegation arrived in 
Russia's Far Eastern Military District. This symbolic visit by the ROK deputy chief 
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of the combat training directorate featured tours of military educational 
institutions, museums and memorials. (ITAR-TASS, 0258 GMT, 15 Oct 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1015, via World News Connection) Although only a cordial military-to-
military meeting, it does set the stage for future contacts. 
 
Who wants to join the Russian military? 
The overall image of the Russian military probably is near an all-time low. 
However, President Putin continues to press on with military reform, reducing the 
total number of servicemen to 1 million by the end of 2001, and retiring 300 
generals. Proposed budget increases will pay for part of the modernization and 
some quality of life improvements. However, the lack of enthusiasm among the 
military for reductions in force structure, and no real roadmap for procurement, 
surely will impede the entire military reform process. (IZVESTIA, 16 Oct 01; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Other issues are affecting the reform process. With a decreasing population of 
eligible draftees, plus a Russian youth apathetic about military service, and with 
increasing numbers of draft-age men classified as "not suitable for military 
service," Russia's military recruitment process is in trouble. The fall callup began 
on 1 October, concurrent with an alternative military service bill submitted to the 
Duma. Of the annual quota of eligible draftees, only 12 percent were actually 
sworn in to serve. Many received college deferments, but most were rejected for 
health reasons, and a strikingly large number (27,000) were classified as draft 
dodgers. According to the head of the main mobilization directorate of the 
General Staff, Col-Gen Vladislav Putilin, "overall 54 percent of young men called 
up for military service have various health problems, including their psychological 
state and other limitations affecting their suitability for military service." (In some 
parts of Russia, the figure is are reported to be as high as 75 percent.) This 
constitutes an increase from the 1998 level of 47 percent. Putilin stated that the 
figure during the Soviet (1989) era was only 2 percent. (ITAR-TASS, 1236 GMT, 
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4 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1004, via World News Connection) Of course, the 
accuracy of the 1989 statistics is debatable. 
 
Overcoming the draftees' lack of enthusiasm for service (who wants to go to 
Chechnya or Tajikistan?), low pay, inadequate housing and poorly maintained 
equipment has proven to be a major challenge for the Russian military. As the 
economy gains momentum, military reform should accompany this trend, or the 
Russian military will continue to atrophy. Putin recently has portrayed the 
announced closure of expensive bases in Cuba and Vietnam as cost-cutting 
measures. (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 18 Oct 01; via ISI Defense and Security) 
This may mean increased funding for modern planes, tanks and ships; Russia 
historically has been big on showmanship over substance, quantity over quality. 
However, to create a modern, effective, well-trained and motivated 21st-century 
military, Moscow must be able to balance appropriately modernization and 
quality of life without overextending its assets. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
And now for the scapegoats... 
Now that Ukraine has been forced to admit its culpability in the downing of a 
Russian Sibir Airliner on 4 October, the search for those who will shoulder the 
blame publicly has begun. Not long after Russian officials announced that a 
Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile fired during training exercises had indeed caused 
the crash, the first two of "the chosen" were ordained. Volodymyr Tkachov, head 
of Ukraine's anti-aircraft forces, and his deputy, Volodymyr Dyakov, were 
suspended on 16 October. The suspensions will remain in effect "until Ukraine's 
investigating commission has reached its final conclusions" about the causes of 
the incident, defense ministry spokesman Konstantin Khivrenko told reporters. 
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(REUTERS, 1118 EST, 17 Oct 01; via Yahoo! News) Since those final 
conclusions are likely to include a finding of negligence on the part of those in 
charge of the exercises, one can assume that these "suspensions" eventually will 
become permanent. Khivrenko, however, did not specify how long the Ukrainian 
investigation will take. However, one can assume also that officials will not rush 
to complete it, given a recent promise from Sibir Airline spokesman Andrei 
Pozdnyakov. "We'll definitely sue as soon as the legal side responsible for the 
crash is determined," he said, suggesting $10 million as a rough estimate of 
corporate damages. This figure, of course, does not include the inevitable 
individual lawsuits. (KIEV POST, 18 Oct 01) 
 
Given the gravity of the situation, Tkachov and Dyakov shouldn't worry about 
being lonely as the hatchet falls. Several political leaders quickly began calling 
for the resignation of Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk. In fact, Kuzmuk 
himself offered his resignation directly to President Leonid Kuchma on the very 
day of the disaster, and now admits that he never doubted a Ukrainian missile 
downed the aircraft. "For me, from the very beginning," he recently said, "there 
were no other versions and there could not be." (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1511 
EST, 19 Oct 01; via Yahoo! News) This statement, of course, differs greatly from 
his denials of responsibility directly following the disaster. On the day of the crash 
-- the very day on which Kuzmuk offered his resignation -- Khivrenko told 
reporters that the defense minister had ruled out the possibility that Ukraine was 
responsible. Then, on 9 October, Kuzmuk told the Rada that the missile in 
question fell into the sea two minutes before the plane exploded. "The plane 
could not have been covered by the lighting beam from a locator, nor could the 
missile have been aimed at it," he said. (INTERFAX, 9 Oct 01; via lexis-nexis) 
[ED. NOTE: At press time, Kuzmuk's resignation was accepted] 
 
Today, following his about-face on the issue, it does not appear that Kuzmuk's 
political rivals will be satisfied with his dismissal; they are also suggesting that he 
be criminally charged with, among other things, "deliberately providing false 
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information to people's deputies" and "abuse of office by a military official." 
(INTERFAX, 1012 GMT, 16 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1016, via World News 
Connection) In a motion supported by the Rada, Deputies Hryhoriy Omelchenko 
and Anatoliy Yermak requested that the prosecutor's office consider opening a 
criminal inquiry into the issue. They wrote, "Ukrainian Defense Minister 
Oleksandr Kuzmuk and Ukrainian Air Defense Commander Volodymyr Tkachov 
knew the plane had been hit by a missile on the day it happened. Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kuchma later confirmed this..., saying that Kuzmuk had filed his 
resignation on 4 October 2001." Defense officials, they continued, "misled the 
people's deputies by saying that the missile could not have hit that plane." And, 
of course, they did. 
 
But what of Kuzmuk's offer to resign on 4 October? Surely, the defense minister 
must have explained to the president why he felt he ought to resign. Still, 
Kuchma immediately rejected the minister's offer. Even more, both Kuzmuk and 
Kuchma soon began denying all responsibility for the incident. On 6 October -- 
two days after Kuzmuk must have expressed his belief that Ukraine was 
responsible for the crash -- Kuchma talked to the press. He explained, "All our 
experts, Ukrainian and Russian, rule out such a possibility from a technical point 
of view," and suggested that the missiles and the plane were on a "completely 
different path." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 6 Oct 01; via lexis-nexis) On 11 
October, Kuchma defended his rejection of Kuzmuk's resignation offer by 
suggesting that the cause of the crash remained unknown. "Being the President 
and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I have not let valuable people go and I won't 
do that in the future," he said. However, "If the culpability of the launching crew is 
confirmed,... that will be a different matter. Somebody will have to bear 
responsibility." (INTERFAX, 1220 GMT, 11 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1011, via 
World News Connection) Yes, somebody, but naturally not he -- despite the fact 
that as "President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief" Kuchma ultimately is 
responsible both for the condition of his country's military and for the way his 
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country responds to crises. In both cases, the performance has been abysmal of 
late. 
 
Following the crash, Ukrainian denials of responsibility smacked of an odd 
combination of incompetence and deception. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 10 Oct 
01, for further background) The leadership's refusal to accept responsibility 
caused a further erosion of respect in some international circles. 
 
Even more importantly for the country's future stability, this accident clearly 
illustrates the sad state of certain areas of Ukraine's military performance. The 
wayward missile -- the second in two years -- reportedly was manufactured in 
1979 and was near the end of its 25-year operational life. According to Ukrainian 
military experts interviewed by the Kiev Post, the country's missile arsenal 
consists solely of Soviet-era items, since Ukraine cannot afford to update its 
stock. Leonid Polyakov of the Ukrainian Center for Political and Economic 
Studies told the Post that the country's $550 million defense budget covers 
neither the maintenance of combat potential, nor upgrades of the military 
hardware, nor science. (KIEV POST, 18 Oct 01) Of course, the country receives 
some money from other Western sources for certain programs, such as 
Partnership for Peace, but military needs clearly are not being met. 
 
Oleksandr Kuzmuk must pay the price for the loss of the Russian airliner on 4 
October, and perhaps, given the seriousness of the situation and the state of the 
country's military, that isn't altogether bad. It will be unfortunate, however, if 
others involved -- from those who helped avoid the truth to those who failed to 
deal with problems in the military -- are absolved somehow by the blame placed 
on Kuzmuk. Indeed, it will be unfortunate, but also very probable. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Russia vs. Romania 
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The Moldovan government over the past month has left no question as to the 
future direction of its foreign policy. Despite statements playing down any interest 
in the Russia-Belarus Union, and repeated suggestions that the country is 
interested in joining the European Union, a clear schism is developing along 
Moldova's border with the West. For the first time, it seems that the country's 
leaders are at least outwardly attempting to break away from Romanian 
influence. In a "nation-building" sense, this development could be seen as 
positive. But unfortunately, the reason seems to have little to do with the desire to 
create a strong, independent identity; instead, the country simply appears to be 
swapping Romanian for Russian influence. With that, Moldova is exchanging its 
strong anchor to Western institutions for Russia, a country desiring that Moldova 
be anchored to it alone. 
 
The Russia vs. Romania debate took center stage earlier this month at the 
European Court of Human Rights. At the hearing, justices listened to a complaint 
from the Romania-based Bessarabian Metropolitan Church of Moldova. The 
church repeatedly has been refused registration in Moldova, although the 
reasons for that refusal have shifted over the years. The church first applied for 
registration in October of 1992. Less than one year before that, Romania had 
responded to the independence of the westernmost former Soviet republics with 
demands that the Molotov-Ribbentro Pact be voided, thereby returning most of 
Moldova to Romanian control. Moldovans, naturally, were not pleased with these 
statements. Unfortunately, the Romanian Metropolitan Church was one of the 
most fervent supporters of a return to pre-World War II borders. So it was 
understandable that Moldova had no interest in allowing the Romanian church on 
its territory. (For further background, see ROMPRES, 1928 GMT, 30 Nov 91; and 
ROMANIAN RADIO, 1046 GMT, 28 Nov 91; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
By 1997, when the Moldovan courts attempted unsuccessfully to force the 
government to register the religious institution, Russia had gained considerable 
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influence in the country, and pushed for the protection of the Moldovan 
Metropolitan Church (subordinate to the Russian patriarchy) as the main 
Orthodox Church in the republic. 
 
Consequently, the Bessarabian Church took its case to the European Court, 
where the Moldovan justice minister used the opportunity to rail against 
Romanian "expansionism" in his prepared testimony. "Direct interference with the 
affairs of sovereign and independent Moldova is masterminded by Romania," Ion 
Morei said, "through some domestic pro-Romanian forces." (BESAPRESS, 1730 
GMT, 3 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1003, via World News Connection) In fact, this 
statement is in some ways true: The vocal Greater Romania Party repeatedly 
refers to Moldova as Romanian land, while the Romanian government itself 
occasionally makes negative comments on Moldovan policies regarding Russia. 
Most recently, for example, Romania took issue with the decision of Moldovan 
officials to make Russian a compulsory subject in schools. However, Moldova 
generally has accepted these statements as a troubling but necessary facet of 
the partnership between the two countries. That seems to have changed. The 
rhetoric from Moldova rarely has been so public and blunt as the justice 
minister's speech before the court. The government's decision to allow this 
speech -- and despite vigorous protests from Romanian officials, the decision not 
to retract it afterward -- speaks volumes about the future foreign policy tilt of the 
Republic of Moldova. Romania seems to understand this, and sent Interior 
Minister Ioan Rus to Chisinau on 14 October to attempt smoothing over the 
disagreement. While there, Rus asked the Moldovan authorities to provide an 
explanation for Morei's remarks. His requests for answers, however, so far have 
gone unheeded. It seems Moldovan officials have other priorities. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
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AZERBAIJAN 
907 hampers anti-terrorism operations 
Azerbaijan has joined the anti-terrorism coalition and offered the US use of its 
airspace, bases and intelligence resources. Yet the US cannot utilize this friendly 
and highly strategic country fully because of outdated restrictions embodied in 
(the pro-Armenian) Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. On 9 October 
Senator Sam Brownback introduced legislation that would waive restrictions of 
aid to the Azeri government if the president determines this is in the US' national 
security interest. (thomas.loc.gov ) 
 
In a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell called for "a national security interest waiver" of restrictions on 
military and intelligence cooperation with Azerbaijan, saying that the US urgently 
needs to foster ties to "track and disrupt assets of the terror network [Al Qaeda]." 
On 11 October, Azerbaijan extradited an Egyptian national suspected of links to 
the terrorist attacks a month earlier. (INTERCON DAILY REPORT, 17 Oct 01; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Section 907 penalizes Azerbaijan, as though it were the aggressor, when 
Armenia in fact is occupying 15% of Azeri territory. By any logical standard those 
restrictions should have been repealed long ago. Now, however, they not only 
damage US impartiality in the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
inhibiting normal democratic development in Azerbaijan, but also hamper the US 
war effort. 
 
This week Azerbaijan has acknowledged that the US has been using 
Azerbaijan's airspace for humanitarian missions. Last week, ITAR-TASS reported 
that two US military transport Hercules aircraft had been sighted in the skies over 
the Azeri capital. The Baku media reported on Wednesday that both aircraft had 
been seen approaching Bina international airport. Ross Wilson, US ambassador 
to Azerbaijan, confirmed a report about flights of US aircraft over Azeri territory. 
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US military aircraft were observed in the skies over Baku on the night of 13-14 
October and in the afternoon of 14 October. (ITAR-TASS, 17 Oct 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Since the use of the airspace does not constitute 
aid to the Azeri government, this does not constitute a violation of 907. 
 
GEORGIA 
Kodori Gorge goes nuts 
"Every fall during the hazelnut-picking season, in the area near the Kodori Gorge, 
there is a little Abkhaz-Georgian war, which ends naturally, when the mountain 
passes become blocked with snow," writes Pavel Felgenhauer an independent 
defense analyst, in the 22 October issue of Moskovskiye novosti. "The nut 
harvest is a golden time for the partisans... the Georgian group seeking the 
'liberation' of Abkhazia and for unemployed Chechen fighters who provide 
'protection.'" 
 
The current round of fighting in Abkhazia began on 4 October when ethnic 
Chechen and Georgian fighters attempted to enter Abkhazia through the 
adjacent Kodori Gorge. What began with a trivial clash can have profound 
consequences. A turf war over hazelnuts can reignite the Abkhaz-Georgian war 
of 1992-93 and have even wider repercussions for regional security, if Russia 
enters the conflict. 
 
What unites paramilitaries? 
The governments of Georgia and Chechnya condemned the incursion into 
Abkhazia and denied any connection with the offending militants. These denials 
seem true because the ethnic Chechens and Georgians in question had been in 
open revolt against their respective governments. 
 
In the case of ethnic Chechens, Ruslan Gelaev is widely rumored to be the 
leader. There is, however, doubt on this score. Gelaev's family has denied these 
rumors. Similarly Akhmad Kadyrov, Putin's administrator for Chechnya, 
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commented that he did not know Gelaev's whereabouts. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 15 
Oct 01) Shevardnadze told Obshchaya gazeta on 18 -24 October 2001 that 
neither Gelaev nor any other Chechen was involved in the events in the Kodori 
Gorge. "As to Gelaev, you have created him like you did all the rest. Incidentally, 
why is Gelaev taken to task but lightly in Russia?" 
 
Shevardnadze's comments should be considered in light of Gelaev's 
background. Gelaev fought together with Shamil Basaev in Abkhazia against 
Georgia during the first war, in 1992-1993. Ostensibly a spontaneous action of 
North Caucasian volunteers, this was in fact a campaign of the Russian security 
services, especially GRU. Later, Gelaev joined the Shura, a shadow government 
working for the overthrow of President Aslan Maskhadov's government. With the 
start of the second Chechen war, Gelaev and his units briefly fought on the side 
of the Chechen government, but, according to Maskhadov, were relieved of their 
duties a year ago. 
 
"Gelaev doesn't represent the Chechen people,... the Chechen government and 
the Chechen resistance," says Maskhadov, "a year ago I enacted an order to 
relieve him from his position... because he proved to be on the territory of 
Georgia. And there is a second order from the commander-in-chief: Generally, 
categorically, in accordance with this order, it is forbidden to attack even Russian 
military targets on the territory of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Knowing 
that the Russian special services want to provoke this conflict, I especially 
enacted this order." (RADIO LIBERTY, 11 Oct 01) 
 
The Georgian paramilitary "Forest Brothers" led by David Shengelia, definitely 
were involved. They repeatedly have staged provocations in the contact zone 
which are roundly condemned by official Tbilisi. The Forest Brothers recruit from 
among the over 250,000 ethnic Georgian refugees who seek a return to their 
homes in Abkhazia.  
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Last Spring Shengelia teamed up with seasoned mafiosi and former KGB agent 
Jaba Ioseliani. (IPRINDA, 24 Apr 01; via BBC) Released from jail in the summer 
of 2000 after having served 2 years of an 11-year sentence for an assassination 
attempt against Shevardnadze, Ioseliani has been trying to revive his Mkhedrioni 
militia and making new provocative gestures against Shevardnadze. (RFE/RL 
CAUCASUS REPORT, 15 May 01) Identified as a former KGB agent, Ioseliani 
played a key role in ousting Georgia's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. 
[Shireen T. Hunter, THE TRANSCAUCASUS IN TRANSITION: NATION-
BUILDING AND CONFLICT (Washington DC: 1994), p. 129] 
 
Criminal elements in the employ of Russian security services undermine the 
legitimate authorities. This situation bears uncomfortable resemblance to the 
circumstances that gave rise to the Russian-Chechen war. If the governments 
concerned adopt responsible policies they can isolate and defeat these criminal-
chekist elements. Or they can exploit these events to launch a new war. 
 
Russia's response 
The Russian foreign ministry issued a statement on 12 October accusing 
Georgia of harboring terrorists: 
 
"The tragic events today are the result of the continued policy of appeasement 
and tolerance toward the Chechen terrorists entrenched in Georgia pursued by 
the Georgian authorities. According to incoming information, these events are 
tending to grow in scope... The present situation being what it is, it only confirms 
the fact that some circles in Tbilisi want a forcible resolution of the Abkhazian 
issue. The situation as it is now taking shape is fraught with the resumption of a 
large-scale armed conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia with the participation 
of international terrorists. The Russian side categorically warns Tbilisi against 
allowing this course of events and insists that Georgia strictly observe its 
commitments under the May 4, 1994 agreement on a cease-fire in the zone of 
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the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and the corresponding resolutions of the UN 
Security Council." (NTV, 12 Oct 01; via Chechnya list) 
 
President Putin promised on 12 October to remove Russia's "peacekeepers" in 
three months, but for now it seems that the Russian military remains engaged. 
Georgia's foreign ministry issued a statement complaining that Georgian villages 
have suffered repeated bombardment by planes coming from Russian air space. 
(KOMMERSANT, 20 Oct 01) 
 
"In 1994 I talked to Russian pilots who in 1992 and 1993 covered up the national 
insignia on their planes and flew raids against Georgian positions in Abkhazia," 
Felgenhauer comments. "One can not dismiss the possibility that the same thing 
occurred this time. In the Abkhaz conflict all the sides lie shamelessly." 
 
"Today the Kodori gorge is being bombed by Mi-24 of the 'Abkhaz air force' but 
there is no way that the Abkhaz can legally purchase Mi-24s, much less obtain 
parts, train crews, or keep them in battle-worthy condition, " Felgenhauer 
maintains. (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 22 Oct 01) 
 
In fact, additional Russian forces are being readied. A reinforced battalion of the 
Russian 58th Army started moving towards the Kabardino-Balkaria sector of the 
Russo-Georgian border to seal off the border against possible incursions from 
Abkhazia. The Russian military plans to deploy similar groups along the entire 
Russian-Georgian border. (RUSSIAN TV, 1600 GMT, 20 Oct 01; via BBC) On 10 
October a representative of the rebel Abkhaz government confirmed that 
"volunteers" from the North Caucasus, including Cossacks, already have started 
to arrive in Abkhazia. (INTERFAX, 10 Oct 01; via BBC)  
 
Abkhazia's response 
The prime minister of the rebel entity, Anri Dzhergenniya, has said that Abkhazia 
has appealed to become a member of the Russian Federation. During a 
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nationally televised interview on TV6 Sunday night, Dzhergenniya emphasized 
that an official notification of the region's political initiative already had been sent 
to Moscow regarding the "associate membership" of Abkhazia within the Russian 
Federation. 
 
Dzhergenniya went on to say that the concept would mean Abkazia's 
incorporation into Russia's legal system. "We're talking about unified legislation, 
a single currency, as well as joint border and customs services," said the 
premier, adding that, "fundamentally, we're talking about Abkhazia joining 
Russia." (strana.ru, 15 Oct 01) 
 
Georgia's response 
Georgia has refrained from military actions. Instead it renewed its requests to 
introduce United Nations peacekeepers to the region. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 13 Oct 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Georgia initially sought 
a UN force after the end of the war in 1993, but on that occasion Abkhazia 
rebuffed UN mediators and held out for a CIS mandate instead. This time, having 
endured all the hardships of "CIS" (actually Russian) mediation, the Abkhaz will 
prove more amenable -- particularly since Putin has promised to remove the 
Russian "peacekeepers." The UN should renew its mediation efforts and 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami and Michael Donahue 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Karimov's gamble 
For all of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's cooperation with the US in its war on 
terrorism, he knows that his country could face repercussions from various 
sources. In the wake of granting permission for the US to use airbases in the 
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country, Karimov has cracked down on the Uzbek media, and imprisoned several 
thousand "Islamic radicals" -- or rather oppositionists -- since 11 September. 
Karimov views such actions as necessary, since the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan has threatened explicitly to attack Uzbekistan, should bases in the 
country be used for launching airstrikes. A Taliban source stated that all 
necessary preparations had been made to launch an attack, should it be 
necessary, and there are unconfirmed reports that 8,000 Taliban fighters have 
moved to the Uzbek border. (PAKISTAN OBSERVER, 11 Oct 01; FBIS-NES-
2001-1011, via World News Connection) 
 
President Karimov is worried sufficiently by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) and the Taliban that he has sketched out a media policy for Uzbekistan 
which aims to control the news released to the population. The government has 
gone to great pains to insist that Uzbek bases are being used only for 
humanitarian purposes, and that "not a single US aircraft which has taken part in 
bombing strikes against the territory of neighboring Afghanistan will be given 
permission to land in Uzbekistan." (EURASIA INSIGHT, Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 
16 Oct 01; via Eurasianet) But all of these efforts may be in vain: Russian and 
Western media reports are readily accessible on TV, and are trusted by Uzbeks 
because of their timeliness. 
 
Although it is encouraging that Uzbekistan has distanced itself from Russian 
influence, there is concern among some observers, such as the International 
Crisis Group (an international organization devoted to encouraging early 
response in conflict areas) that the US need for a Central Asian ally will dampen 
criticism of Karimov's human rights record and the absence of free media in the 
country: "Following these events (11 September), it becomes much more difficult 
to give the Uzbek government a negative rating, because this might be seen as 
interfering with the war effort and military cooperation between the two 
countries." Additionally, there is concern that the "potential for increased anti-
Western feeling" will come to the forefront. (EURASIANET Q &A, "Assessing The 
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Ramifications of US Troop Deployment in Central Asia," 16 Oct 01; via 
Eurasianet) The IMU generally has not expressed anti-US or anti-Western 
sentiments, but might do so now that Uzbekistan actively is aiding the fight 
against the IMU's Taliban allies. 
 
There is an opportunity for Uzbekistan to enhance its new friendship with the US, 
as exemplified by a joint statement issued on 12 October: 
 
"The Government of the United States of America, and the Government of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan recognize international terrorism as a serious threat to 
peace and to global and regional stability. Our two governments have decided to 
establish a qualitatively new relationship based on a long-term commitment to 
advance security and regional security." Furthermore, the press release 
stipulated, the US would provide assistance in the event of a threat to 
Uzbekistan's territorial integrity. (EURASIA INSIGHT, Uzbekistan Daily Digest, 12 
Oct 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
Uzbekistan's position is finely balanced: The country has pulled out of the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty and joined GUUAM. Yet Karimov recently felt Russian 
pressure sufficiently to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is 
important, therefore, to note that the United States has an obligation to 
Uzbekistan, both in terms of dealing with the IMU, and in economic terms. For if 
this operation were to be short, and the US presence to disappear quickly, 
Uzbekistan once more might be drawn back into the Russian sphere of influence. 
 
Is Russia experiencing a crisis of influence in Central Asia? 
The current American "War on Terrorism," and the new US-Uzbek relationship it 
has created, have triggered growing concern on Putin's side over Russia's 
putative diminution of influence in Central Asia . However, the joint US-Uzbek 
statement delivered on 12 October is only the latest in a line of signals that 
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Central Asia is slipping, or at least trying to slip, from the Russian sphere of 
influence. 
 
The agreement reached between the United States and Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov includes American security guarantees to Karimov's government in 
exchange for the use of military facilities for launching operations against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 21 Oct 01; via Eurasianet) While 
initially US military forces based in Uzbekistan were going to be limited to 
conducting only support functions, presumably to avoid stirring opposition within 
the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), It appears that the American 
commitment to Karimov's security and the dollars that will undoubtedly 
accompany it have changed the playing field.  
 
Even before the events of 11 September, Tashkent and the other Central Asia 
capitals were doing their best to move out of Moscow's sphere of influence, albeit 
with varying results. Long the driving force behind the region's security strategy, 
Russian diplomatic sources report misgivings about the newly minted Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (of which it was a founding member), in that the 
organization now appears to become a likely vehicle for diminished, rather than 
expanded, Russian influence in the area. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 20 Jun 01; via 
Eurasianet) 
 
The new group is more likely to be dominated by China, which has been taking a 
growing interest in the Central Asian nations' security and economic affairs. An 
official with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
indicated on 14 October that relations between China and the neighboring 
Central Asian nations are set to enter a new stage. One can assume that this 
new relationship will be based on continuing Chinese investment in the region -- 
which recently surpassed US $500 million. (XINHUA, 1545 GMT, 14 Oct 01; 
FBIS-CHI-2001-1014, via World News Connection) 
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Growing foreign investment and increased domestic efficiency are setting the 
stages for further independence, specifically in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
While the new security arrangement between Washington and Tashkent has set 
the conditions for the Uzbeks, international investment, specifically from Beijing, 
Berlin and Washington, and positive domestic economic signs are doing the 
same for Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Kazakh Economics and Trade 
Minister Zhaksybek Kulekeev reported a 14% increase in GDP and a 13.8% rise 
in industrial production for the first nine months of 2001 which, coupled with the 
production of an estimated 46 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate in 2002, 
seems to indicate that foreign investment is likely to expand in the future. 
(INTERFAX, 15 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-2016, via World News Connection) 
 
While the spirit of autonomy is alive in some of the Central Asian nations, 
Taijikistan remains firmly in Russia's camp. As the entire region tightens its 
borders in anticipation of possible Afghan refugees attempt to escape the 
American "War on Terrorism," the Tajiks appear to be more than just on the 
defensive. On the Tajik-Afghan border, and in front of Tajik troops, stands the 
Russia 201st Division, consisting of 20,000 soldiers, 180 tanks, 340 armored 
personnel carriers, 180 artillery pieces, and significant air support. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 13 Oct 01; via Eurasianet) In light of President Putin's determination 
not to be left on the sidelines as the US conducts its military operations, it is likely 
that Russia will resort to offensive operations based on Tajikistan and post-
conflict security arrangements linking Dushanbe and Moscow even more closely. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Terrorism and its impacts 
Recently the Baltic states not only have expressed their heartfelt sympathy for 
the American public and those affected by the 11 September terrorist attacks, but 
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also have affirmed their support for NATO and the United States in the "War on 
Terrorism." However, these expressions have placed the Baltic states in a 
somewhat uncomfortable position. As the "War on Terrorism" escalates into 
direct confrontation between the combatants, the Baltic states seek to address 
domestic issues related to this support as well as to ponder the direction in which 
new American/Russian relations will proceed. 
 
The Baltic states' support has not gone unnoticed by the United States or NATO. 
In a letter sent to Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President Bush stated, 
"the American people are grateful for the expressions of friendship and support." 
(LETA, 1347 GMT, 11 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-200-1001, via World News Connection) 
However, this support has generated minor repercussions internally. 
 
Fear of an anthrax outbreak developed in Estonia, after a letter -- containing an 
unidentified white powder -- was found in Parnu. The fear caused Social Affairs 
Minister Eiki Nestor to make a public address in which he stated, "the danger of 
anthrax reaching Estonia is real, but there's no cause for panic." (BNS, 1332 
GMT, 16 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1015, via World News Connection) He went on 
to explain that, although Estonia was at risk, it should not be a primary concern 
because the stores of antibodies in the country are sufficient and the ability to 
obtain proper medical treatment is also sufficient to handle any emergency of this 
kind. 
 
In Latvia, the insignificant Islamic minority has voiced dissension and views the 
attacks on Afghanistan as a general attack on all of Islam. The leader of the 
Latvian Muslims, Musans Macigovs, "pointed out that criminals are residing in 
Latvia as well, however, nobody walks in the streets with an automatic rifle to kill 
them." (LETA, 1000 GMT, 8 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1008 via World News 
Connection) Meanwhile, the Christian Democrats in Riga have called on the US 
Republican Party not to escalate the operations, and is further calling on it to 
seek a peaceful settlement to the situation. However, while these domestic 
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aspects have had a limited impact on the overall desire of the Baltic states to join 
NATO and other Western institutions, the new relationship between the United 
States and Russia has caused alarm throughout the Baltic states. 
 
Baltic leaders are concerned that the new relationship will affect the NATO 
expansion process, which is scheduled currently for the alliance's autumn 2002 
summit. After observing a recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the chairman of 
the Estonian parliament's defense commission, Tiit Tammsaar, commented on 
the potential fallout of recent events. "The effect of the terror attacks and the war 
in Afghanistan could be clearly felt at the NATO Assembly session where more 
attention than usual was given to the Russian delegation and no name of a 
concrete candidate country was included in the final resolution on NATO 
enlargement." (BNS, 1107 GMT, 12 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1012 via World 
News Connection) This comes on the heels of the announcement by the Russian 
ambassador to Lithuania that, despite recent proclamations, Russia's position on 
NATO enlargement has not changed. That has caused the Baltic states to seek 
support by reiterating official expressions of their desire to join NATO and other 
Western institutions.  
 
The autumn NATO summit still may be over a year away, but the Baltic states 
are not going to sit around while the United States and NATO conduct coalition 
building for the war on terrorism. They are seeking to reaffirm their security 
needs in order to ensure that consideration for membership in NATO remains 
open for all aspirants. After all, as the president of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, 
explained, "NATO enlargement will help create an alliance of democracies 
sharing and defending common ideals." (BNS, 0915 GMT, 5 Oct 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-1005, via World News Connection) 
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